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ABSTRACT 
 
This study utilizes a sample of private equity backed acquisitions to test 
whether certain factors, evaluated and quantified on the date of transaction 
completion, serve as indicators of future transaction bankruptcy.  The results of this 
paper suggest that the effective federal funds rate is significantly and positively 
correlated with the bankruptcy of private equity backed transactions.  Other measured 
factors specific to the private equity sponsor, the target firm in the acquisition and the 
characteristics of the transaction are found to be insignificant.  Analysis on the 
influence of these factors is performed using two types of binary-response models, 
which predict the likelihood of the occurrence of bankruptcy, and a matched sample 
model that tests for the difference of means between a non-bankrupt transaction group 
and a bankrupt transaction group.  Limitations in the availability of data derived from 
the private nature of the industry resulted in a limited sample size of 259 transactions 
completed from 1989 to 2008.  General insignificance in the results of this study 
merits further analysis on the contributing factors to private equity transaction failure.   
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Zalmon G. Simmons revolutionized an industry and created an American 
business empire over one hundred and thirty years ago with the decision to mass-
produce woven wire mattresses out of a small factory in Kenosha, Wisconsin, which 
resulted in the establishment of Simmons Bedding Company.  The firm’s subsequent 
reign over the bedding industry for over a century places Simmons in the same group 
with some of the oldest and most dominant firms in America’s big-business history.  
Simmons was founded in 1870 during a period marked by rapid economic and 
population growth known as the “Gilded Age.”1  This era produced a number of 
dominant American manufacturing giants including Ford Motor Company, Standard 
Oil and United States Steel.  While Simmons would likely not be in the running for a 
spot next to Ford on a list of America’s greatest firms in history, most firms that have 
employed hundreds of thousands of Americans and have posted hundreds of millions 
of dollars in profit are recognized as quintessentially American.   
In a history characterized by resilience and innovation, Simmons introduced 
the cotton felt mattress upon the conclusion of World War I, the studio couch (also 
known as the futon) as a low-cost alternative to the mattress during the Great 
Depression and king and queen sized mattresses in the late 1950s.  Simmons later 
moved its headquarters to Atlanta, founded the Simmons Research Center to focus on 
product development, became the Official Bedding Supplier of the 1980 Winter 
Games in Lake Placid (Simmons Bedding Company, 2009) and was acquired in a 
                                                 
1
 Mark Twain and Charles Dudley Warner coined “Gilded Age” in their book The Gilded Age: A Tale of 
Today to refer to the extravagance and opulence of America’s upper class during the post-Civil War 
Reconstruction era. 
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leveraged buyout (LBO) by prominent private equity firm Wesray Capital 
Corporation in 1986 for $120 million.  After chopping up the company into distinct 
businesses and selling a number of them in order to pay back a portion of the capital 
that it had borrowed to finance the acquisition, Wesray sold Simmons to the second 
private equity group2 in a string of five consecutive private equity backed deals3 
completed from 1986 to 2003.  As sales and profits eroded during the recent 
economic downturn, Simmons was forced to file for corporate bankruptcy in 2009 
under the Chapter 11 bankruptcy code of reorganization after defaulting on a 
scheduled interest payment on a portion of the firm’s $1.3 billion in outstanding 
liabilities on its balance sheet (Creswell, 2009). 
The fall of one of America’s oldest and strongest companies under the 
management of Thomas H. Lee Partners (THL), an experienced sponsor in the private 
equity industry, did not go unnoticed in the financial press.  According to Julie 
Creswell of The New York Times, the private equity sponsors involved in the string 
of LBO deals posted over $750 million in profits in the form of capital management 
fees,4 incentive fees5 and dividend recapitalizations6 by acting as the general partners 
                                                 
2
 The terms “private equity sponsor,” “private equity group” and “private equity firm” are used 
interchangeably in this paper.  
3
 A “private equity backed deal” occurs when a public or private investment firm acquires a firm in 
order to take an active role in the management of its operations. 
4
 A “management fee” is the “percentage of the fund’s net assets under management that is paid 
annually to fund management for administering the fund” (Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft, 
1999). 
5
 An “incentive fee” is paid to the fund manager “only if the returns surpass some hurdle rate or ‘high 
water mark’ – meaning there is no incentive fee until the fund has recovered past losses” 
(Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft, 1999). 
6
 A ‘dividend recapitalization,’ also known as a ‘leveraged recapitalization,’ is the “process of 
borrowing money to issue a special dividend to owners or shareholders allowing them to recover a 
significant portion of their initial investment and make a substantial return in a buy-out very quickly” 
(Sousa, 2010). 
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(GPs) in limited liability partnerships (LLPs)7 with investors that contribute capital to 
the sponsor’s underlying private equity funds.8  These underlying private equity funds 
lock up investor capital for a pre-specified investment horizon.  At the end of a fund’s 
investment horizon, the GP is required to close out of its position in all investments, 
i.e. sell its stake in all companies acquired during the lifetime of the fund.  A private 
equity fund’s relatively short investment horizon9 and fee structure are brandished by 
Creswell to explain her characterization of Simmons’s buyout history as “a Wall 
Street version of ‘Flip This House.’”  During the THL holding period, the private 
equity firm netted $77 million in profits even as one quarter of the firm’s four 
thousand employees were laid off and the firm’s debt load increased by over seventy 
percent from roughly $750 million to $1.3 billion as THL issued $375 million of 
additional debt to fund dividend recapitalizations.  THL was unable to renegotiate the 
terms of the debt with the firm’s creditors once Simmons’s cash on hand became 
insufficient to service its upcoming interest payment and put the firm up for sale.  
With potential suitors concerned over the firm’s highly levered capital structure, the 
offering proved unsuccessful and THL was forced to usher the firm into bankruptcy.10  
Refer to Figure 1 in the Appendix for a detailed illustration of Simmons’s acquisition 
history and corresponding debt load since 1991. 
                                                 
7
 The structure of this arrangement allows investors to maintain “limited liability,” i.e. responsibility 
only for contributed capital while the “general partner” acts as the manager of acquired firms and 
maintains unlimited liability. 
8
 A private equity group typically has a “portfolio” of underlying private equity funds that operate 
independently in the acquisition of target firms. 
9
 The average private equity fund’s holding period is roughly six years (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2008). 
10
 Simmons Bedding Company filed for bankruptcy with THL as its sponsor on November 16, 2009 and 
was acquired out of bankruptcy by Ares Management and Teachers’ Private Capital on January 20, 
2010 in a $760 million LBO transaction that reduced Simmons’s debt load to $450 million. 
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Although the firm’s road to failure, paved by private equity buyouts, is 
remarkable to recount, firm failure in the private equity industry is not entirely 
uncommon.  Research on the demography of the industry estimates that roughly six 
percent (Strömberg, 2007) of all the private equity transactions completed from 1970 
to 2007 are destined to fail.  Julie Creswell and other critics of private equity argue 
that a transaction’s failure can be traced back to the methods employed by the profit-
driven sponsor to fund the acquisition such as an LBO or a dividend recapitalization, 
both of which involve the issuance of debt.  On the other hand, industry proponents, 
including executives at THL, typically reject the idea that leverage contributes to a 
transaction’s failure and point to the economic climate, industry vulnerability and 
other externalities as the contributing factors. 
As is the case with most arguments, closer examination of the issue at hand 
can illuminate the validity in the rationale of each of the contrasting arguments.  This 
provokes one to consider a host of other factors that may serve as indicators of future 
bankruptcy.  This study takes an objective stance on this argument by analyzing a 
number of quantifiable factors upon the closing date of private equity acquisitions and 
the respective influence of these factors on transaction bankruptcy risk.  A bankruptcy 
risk prediction model based on the fundamentals of predecessors such as Edward 
Altman’s Z-Score and ZETA™ models and refined to specifically evaluate the 
private equity industry is synthesized to examine the myriad of potentially influential 
factors for each observation in a 259-transaction sample.  
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 The private equity industry first became important to financial academics and 
the press during the private equity boom of the late 1980s, which is notorious for the 
leveraged buyout (LBO) acquisition.  The financial press honed in on the excessive 
levels of debt used to acquire target firms and the employee layoffs and cost-cutting 
initiatives that typically follow.  During economic expansions, the most debt-laden 
LBOs can be “financed with anywhere between 60 and 90 percent debt” (Kaplan and 
Strömberg, 2008), because the LBO’s risk and reward profile that enables sponsors to 
achieve levered returns11 calls for the sponsor to contribute some portion of the 
capital for the transaction as the creditor makes up the difference between the total 
transaction value and the sponsor’s contributed equity.  Transactions financed with 
extreme levels of debt typically occur during times of economic expansion because 
cheap credit is abundant and lending standards are low (Brunnermeier, 2009). 
 While the LBO is unquestionably the most popular method used by sponsors, 
acquisitions also occur in other forms including joint ventures, where multiple 
partners put up the equity to finance a transaction, and equity buyouts, where no debt 
is used to finance an acquisition.  Those in favor of private equity acquisitions argue 
that the expertise of a private equity sponsor can be beneficial for the acquired firm 
when the sponsor cuts operating costs by reorganizing the firm’s internal structure.  
Proponents also believe enhanced leverage “disciplines managers whose strategies 
are wasting resources” (Jensen, 1986), due to the high interest payments that the firm 
                                                 
11
 “Levered returns” are achieved when an investor pledges equity in conjunction with borrowing 
capital to purchase a financial asset.  This strategy generates more volatility in the returns on the 
investment. 
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inherents post-acquisition.  Opponents of the industry point to the acquired firm’s 
reduced interest coverage ratio,12 which is used to measure a firm’s ability to service 
its interest, as detrimental to the firm’s growth prospects because managers may not 
have enough cash available to invest in profitable projects. 
 This paper focuses on how quantitative factors and fundamental 
characteristics of the parties involved contribute to the bankruptcy risk of private 
equity backed transactions.  The contributors that have been observed in previous 
literature include macroeconomic conditions, industry conditions and characteristics 
specific to the sponsor, target and transaction (Altman, Sabato and Nicholas, 2008).  
It is essential to weigh both the combined and individual effects of these contributors 
in order to construct a bankruptcy risk prediction model specific to the private equity 
industry. 
 The literature on failure prediction models originates with Altman’s Z-Score 
model from 1968,  which employs multiple discriminant analysis (MDA)13 using five 
financial accounting ratios14 in a model to evaluate the bankruptcy risk for public 
manufacturing corporations.  Altman found the model to hold a predictive accuracy 
of 71.9% and 36.0% two years prior and five years prior, respectively, to the event of 
bankruptcy for firms during the sample period (Altman, 1968).  Altman revisited the 
model in 1977 to develop the “second generation” ZETA™ model to reflect the 
“temporal nature of [bankruptcy] data.”  This model holds a predictive accuracy of 
                                                 
12
 Interest coverage ratio = [Free Cash Flow / Interest Expense] 
13
 “Multiple discriminant analysis” is a “unified approach [to] solving a research problem involving 
multivariate comparisons of several groups” using a number of explanatory variables (Tatsuoka and 
Tiedeman, 1954). 
14
 Altman’s financial accounting ratios include (i) Working Capital / Total Assets; (ii) Retained Earnings 
/ Total Assets; (iii) EBIT / Total Assets; (iv) Market Value of Equity / Total Liabilities; and (v) Sales / 
Total Assets. 
12 
 
84.9% and 69.8% two years and five years prior to bankruptcy, respectively (Altman, 
Haldeman and Narayanan, 1977).  Altman later adapts his models to evaluate both 
private firms and another for non-manufacturing firms (Altman, 2000).  These 
developments in failure prediction models opened the door of opportunity by 
allowing for a host of different types of firms and transactions to be evaluated. 
 Shumway (2001) argues that static models15 such as Altman’s “are 
inappropriate for forecasting bankruptcy because… bankruptcy occurs infrequently 
[and] forecasters use samples that span several years to estimate their models.” 
Shumway constructs a hazard rate model16 that resolves the problem of evaluating 
data that is temporal in nature by explicitly accounting for time.  Shumway attests 
that the improvement in the predictive power from Altman’s Z-Score model to his 
ZETA model is founded on biased inferences that are inherent within the framework 
of static models.  Hazard rate models account for these biases by controlling for each 
firm’s period at risk, incorporating time-varying effects and also produce more 
efficient out-of-sample forecasts for the general population of firms by testing a larger 
sample within a longer observation period.  Shumway’s hazard rate model proved to 
have a statistically significant predictive accuracy of 86.4% two years prior to 
bankruptcy with a misclassification error of 2.4% as opposed to Altman’s results of 
77.6% and 8.8%, respectively.  As is, Shumway’s model cannot be adapted to 
measure the probability of failure for private firms, i.e. those lacking publicly 
                                                 
15
 A “static model” is one that evaluates the distribution of sample with specified parameters at a 
particular moment in time. 
16
 A “hazard rate model” is a model that allows for the evaluation of independent hazard rates at 
different intervals. 
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available information, because Shumway depends on continuous firm-specific 
information flow to model bankruptcy risk probability movements over time. 
 Chava and Jarrow (2004) examine the merits of a private firm hazard rate 
model for the time period of 1962 to 1999 using the same construct as Shumway’s 
model but “without the market variables and only using the accounting variables,” as 
market data is neither available nor relevant for private firms.  The researchers 
initially examine the predictive power of the bankruptcy hazard rate model for private 
firms using annual accounting data for which they find a predictive accuracy of 
44.0% for a firm’s future bankruptcy.  The pair then examines a model using monthly 
accounting data and finds an increase in the predictive accuracy to 65.3%.  This 
increase in predictive power with the use of shorter observation intervals allows the 
researchers to conclude that the timeliness of reported information is an important 
aspect of bankruptcy prediction accuracy.  The predictive accuracy of this private 
firm hazard rate bankruptcy model is significantly lower than previous models that 
evaluated bankruptcy prediction for public firms, supporting the “notion of market 
efficiency with respect to publicly available accounting information” for failure 
prediction models.  Unfortunately, the collection of monthly, quarterly or even annual 
data from the private equity industry is difficult, if not altogether impossible, which 
automatically reduces the theoretical effectiveness of a bankruptcy risk prediction 
model with a private equity focus. 
 Andrade and Kaplan (1998) argue for the inclusion of variables that measure 
macroeconomic and industry conditions in addition to firm-specific variables in their 
analysis on highly levered transactions.  Included in these groups are variables that 
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account for industry performance, firm performance within its industry, prevailing 
interest rates and the firm’s relative interest expense within its industry.  In addition, 
the researchers generate transaction-specific variables such as transaction debt to 
equity composition and dummies for the presence of junk bonds and the presence 
(and value) of bank debt in the LBO transaction.  The formation of the variable 
groups in this study requires comprehensive information on all of the observations in 
order to construct a uniform data set.  Generally, this information is difficult to come 
by for private equity transactions due to the clandestine nature of the industry’s 
investment procedures. 
The use of variables that analyze non-financial fundamentals in failure 
prediction models such as firm age, type of business, industrial sector, family 
ownership and auditor information, among others, has become prominent in recent 
years (Altman, Sabato and Nicholas, 2008).  Wilson, Wright and Altanlar (2010) have 
found a number of these qualitative variables to exhibit statistical significance across 
the three major types of buyout transactions in the United Kingdom: the management 
buyout (MBO),17 the management buy-in (MBI)18 and the third-party private equity 
backed buyout.  Some of the fundamental target-specific variables used in this study 
are dummies for family ownership, CEO or board member replacements and changes 
in a firm’s auditor.  To date, little research on the private equity industry focuses on 
how the presence of a private equity sponsor affects the financial health of the 
acquired firm.  While the typical sponsor is largely motivated by profit, it also brings 
                                                 
17
 A “management buyout” (MBO) usually involves a private equity acquisition in which the existing 
management takes a substantial proportion of the equity, which may be a majority stake in smaller 
transactions (Wilson, Wright and Altanlar, 2010). 
18
A “management buy-in” (MBI) is an MBO where the management team is composed of outsiders 
(Wilson, Wright and Altanlar, 2010). 
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a wealth of experience to the acquired firm, which allows the sponsor to act as an 
effective manager of operations. 
The survey literature on this field has analyzed the demography of the private 
equity industry, fund investments, investment time horizons and the subsequent 
returns associated with these investments (Strömberg, 2007).  Few have delved into 
the qualitative and quantitative attributes of a third-party private equity sponsor and 
the role these attributes may play in the eventual success or bankruptcy of the target 
firm.  I propose that variables relating to the participation, decisions and qualities of a 
private equity fund are significant in the prediction of an acquired firm’s bankruptcy.  
Research suggests the “odds of encountering financial distress or going bankrupt” are 
smaller when highly leveraged buyouts are sponsored by a third-party private equity 
group (Halpern, Kieschnick and Rotenberg, 2009).  
This study will rely on “snapshot data,” which is analogous to the type of data 
on a financial balance sheet, in order to analyze the predictive power of factors that 
have been observed and quantified on the date of a transaction’s completion, as the 
nature of the industry prohibits continuous data collection.  Accountants describe a 
balance sheet as a “snapshot” of the financial health of a company at a particular 
moment in time.  This model aims to discover those factors that may serve as 
indicators of transaction failure by testing variables that have been designed to 
measure the impact of different forces on a transaction’s eventual fate.  
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3 HYPOTHESIS 
 
 The data service that is most prominently used in this study is CapitalIQ, an 
online financial research service owned by Standard and Poor’s that is used to 
analyze transactions by filling in data for a list of pre-determined variables.  It is 
important to decide on these variables prior to using CapitalIQ’s “transaction 
screening” tool because the generation of a uniform sample, i.e. one that contains a 
data point for every variable of concern for every observation, is necessary for the 
synthesis of a bankruptcy risk prediction model. 
 There are four variable groups of interest, each of which contains multiple 
underlying explanatory variables, whose contributions towards a transaction’s 
eventual fate are tested.  The first variable group measures the influence of 
macroeconomic conditions on a transaction’s eventual bankruptcy.  I hypothesize that 
poor macroeconomic conditions upon the date of the transaction result in lower of 
bankruptcy likelihood.  The rationale behind this hypothesis is attributed to the more 
rigorous selection process that sponsors are required to take when selecting firms 
during times of economic hardship.  While investor capital is usually locked up in 
private equity investments for a number of years by contractual obligation, incoming 
capital generally dries up during economic contractions, which forces firms to 
allocate resources more effectively by selecting the targets with the most profit 
potential.  In order to do this, sponsors are theorized to work with additional caution 
during recessions and select firms that are better suited for a private equity backed 
acquisition. 
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The next two variable groups focus on the descriptive characteristics of 
private equity sponsors and their targets.  The sponsor-specific group hypothesizes 
that transactions involving sponsors with less years of experience,19 multiple 
sponsors20 and public sponsors21 will be more prone to bankruptcy than transactions 
backed by private equity firms whose characteristics fall on the opposite side of the 
spectrum.  The target-specific group hypothesizes that public targets with more years 
of experience and operating within more stable industries22 will be less prone to 
bankruptcy than younger firms that are private and operate within industries more 
sensitive to consumer demand preferences, e.g. the consumer discretionary products 
industry.   
 The final variable group analyzes transaction-specific data centered on the 
more empirical characteristics of a transaction.  A number of dummy variables are 
used to examine the influence of different types of transactions on their eventual 
successes or failures.  Included in this group are dummy variables for the presence of 
(i) an LBO; (ii) a secondary LBO;23 (iii) a public to private transaction;24 (iv) target 
management participation in the transaction; and (v) a dividend recapitalization.  I 
hypothesize that bankruptcy risk will be higher for a transaction involving an LBO, 
secondary LBO or dividend recapitalization and lower for a transaction that is public 
to private or involves management participation. 
                                                 
19
 “Years of experience” is calculated using the formula: [2010 or Bankruptcy Year – Founding Year]. 
20
 A private equity backed transaction can often involve multiple private equity sponsors. 
21
 These are private equity sponsors that are traded on a public exchange.  
22
 Measured by ranking industry inelasticity of demand,” e.g. consumer staples industry is very 
inelastic. 
23
 A “secondary LBO” is an LBO acquisition of a firm that has previously been acquired in an LBO. 
24
 A “public to private” transaction occurs when a private equity sponsor buys a publicly-traded target 
firm and takes it private. 
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 While all the variable groups may have underlying variables that hold 
explanatory power in the model, the variables in the sponsor-specific group and the 
transaction-specific group are of the most analytical importance in this study.  These 
variable groups aim to examine the role of the sponsor, the financing decisions made 
by the sponsor, the managerial experience and the techniques that the sponsor brings 
to the table during the acquisition process. 
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4 DATA 
 
4.1 Data Collection 
 
The data collection process is extensive in the construction of a model to 
predict bankruptcy risk for private equity backed transactions.  CapitalIQ, an online 
“comprehensive fundamental and quantitative” financial research service, is the 
primary source used to construct the sample.  CapitalIQ’s screening tool allows 
subscribed users to screen for data that fits into a specified set of parameters.  The 
service has a database of specific information on a range of firms, transactions, 
investment vehicles and news that is generally unavailable elsewhere on the web.  
The parameters in my screening were set to render all closed merger and acquisition 
transactions backed by investment firms that have occurred in the United States since 
1989 with total transaction values in excess of $150 million.  While CapitalIQ allows 
us to gather information on transactions specifically backed by private equity 
sponsors, the screening tool does not have a filter for this parameter.  The resulting 
sample contained a host of mergers and acquisitions conducted by all investment 
firms, including firms not classified as private equity sponsors.  In addition, CapitalIQ 
does not allow screens to render information for a specified set of variables.  
Consequently, the generation of a dataset for the pre-specified variable list involves a 
labor-intensive process to weed out the observations that do not fit the above 
parameters or do not contain enough information to fill in data for each of the 
variables. 
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 The screening parameters listed above were used as filters in the initial 
CapitalIQ screen, which rendered 2,326 unique transactions.  Upon closer 
examination, it became apparent that a number of these observations did not qualify 
as private equity backed transactions or did not have enough data to use in a model 
whose creation is contingent on the ability to collect data for each of the variables for 
all of the observations within the sample.  The contingencies and parameters imposed 
on the originally collected data caused roughly 88.9% of the original sample to be 
excluded from the baseline sample. 
 
4.2 Data Filtration 
 
Exhibit 1: Data Filtration Process 
 
 
The first step of the filtration process requires the identification of each of the 
2,326 transactions as either “private equity backed” or “non private equity backed” in 
order to catch all mergers and acquisitions that are misclassified by CapitalIQ’s 
screening tool.  Approximately 77.8% (1,810 observations) of the sample rendered 
from the screen is eliminated in this filtration step, underscoring the weakness of 
 ∆ Sample % Eliminated New Sample % of Original
Original Sample 2,326 0.0% 2,326 100.0%
Transaction Eliminations/Additions:
Non private equity backed transactions (1,810) 77.8% 516 22.2%
No "percent sought" information (44) 1.9% 472 20.3%
No "buyer/seller" information (24) 1.0% 448 19.3%
No "target date founded" information (14) 0.6% 434 18.7%
No "consideration offered" information (7) 0.3% 427 18.4%
No "transaction secondary features" information (6) 0.3% 421 18.1%
No "deal resolution" information (5) 0.2% 416 17.9%
REIT transactions (112) 4.8% 304 13.1%
Transactions backed by hedge fund sponsors (5) 0.2% 299 12.9%
Transactions with "percent sought" less than 61.0% (11) 0.5% 288 12.4%
Transactions occuring post-2008 (29) 1.2% 259 11.1%
Sum/Remainder (2,067) 88.9% 259 11.1%
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observation misclassification when using a screening tool to gather data.  The next 
step in the process discards all the observations without data for every variable in the 
pre-determined variable list by sorting through the sample to find transactions without 
information for (i) percentage sought; (ii) buyer/seller; (iii) target date founded; (iv) 
type of consideration25 offered; (v) transaction features; or (vi) deal resolution.  An 
additional 100 transactions (4.3% of the original sample) without data for the pre-
determined variables were eliminated. 
The filtration process then eliminates transactions misclassified as “private 
equity backed” in the first step by examining the sponsors and their targets more 
closely.  Another 112 transactions (4.8% of the original sample) are found to have 
been backed by real estate investment trusts (REITs),26 which are not private equity 
investment entities but rather investment vehicles that acquire properties and property 
portfolios.  An additional 5 transactions (0.2% of the original sample) are excluded 
for being backed by hedge fund sponsors,27 which differentiate themselves from 
private equity sponsors by seeking active investor roles as opposed to insider 
management roles.  To further address this potential classification issue, another 11 
transactions (0.5% of the original sample) are thrown out because the buyer acquired 
less than 61.0% of the target, suggesting investor activism as opposed to active 
management.  Finally, 29 transactions (1.2% of the original sample) are eliminated 
for having occurred post-2008.  This filtration excludes any transaction in its infancy, 
                                                 
25
 The “type of consideration” variable measures the type of collateral used to finance the acquisition 
of the target entity.  A consideration can be offered in the form of cash, common equity or preferred 
equity, among many others. 
26
 A “REIT” is “similar to a closed-end mutual fund [that] invest[s] in real estate or loans secured by 
real estate” (Bodie, Kane and Marcus, 2005). 
27
 A “hedge fund” is a private investment pool… that is largely exempt from SEC regulation that can 
pursue more speculative [investments] than mutual funds (Bodie, Kane and Marcus, 2005). 
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i.e. younger than two years old, in order to give all transactions within the sample 
enough time to encounter financial or operating distress.  The inclusion of young 
transactions could cause the data to become skewed because transactions doomed for 
failure are less likely to fail within a short time interval. 
The remaining 259 transactions represent approximately 11.0% of the sample 
rendered from the initial screen.  This “baseline sample” is evaluated throughout this 
paper to evaluate the effectiveness of a model that measures the effects of a number 
of regressors on the bankruptcy risk for private equity backed transactions.  Each of 
the observations in the sample is chosen because it fits the criteria of being private 
equity backed and because information is available to collect data for each of the 
elected regressors that are grouped to explore the influences of sponsor, firm and 
target characteristics and the prevailing macroeconomic conditions on the probability 
of eventual target firm failure.  Within the baseline sample, 18 transactions (6.9%) 
experience a future bankruptcy, closely mirroring results found by Strömberg (2007) 
and by Wilson, Wright and Altanlar (2010), in which 6.0 – 8.0% of all global private 
equity backed buyouts experience future bankruptcy.  Refer to Figure 2 for an 
historical overview of private equity backed LBO bankruptcy rates. 
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5 RESULTS 
 
5.1 Matched Sample Model 
 
A matched sample of 33 bankrupt firms and 33 non-bankrupt firms was first 
utilized by Edward Altman to create his Z-Score model in 1968.  As discussed in the 
literature review, all of these (public manufacturing) firms were matched by type of 
industry and approximate asset size.  Considering Altman’s relatively small sample 
size of 66 firms, the formation of an 18-transaction non-bankrupt group to match the 
18 bankruptcies observed within the collected sample appears feasible.  With the 
intent of replicating Altman’s methodology, non-bankrupt transactions are paired 
with each of the 18 bankrupt transactions by transaction value and the target firm 
industry inelasticity ranking.28  In his study, Altman restricts firm asset size range 
from $1 to $25 million to exclude smaller firms that do not release comprehensive 
financial information and also to exclude larger firms, which exhibited a low 
incidence of bankruptcy during the era.  The framework of my study requires a lower 
bound on transaction size to exclude those smaller transactions that may skew the 
data but does not require the use of an upper bound on transaction values because not 
much is known about the relationship between transaction size and bankruptcy risk.  
A bankrupt group of 18 transactions and non-bankrupt group of 18 transactions are 
formed from the original sample of 259 to yield a matched sample of 36 private 
equity backed acquisitions that evaluates bankruptcy risk using the variable groups 
noted in the data section.  Ideally, a transaction-specific variable for leverage would 
                                                 
28
 In this study, a target’s industry inelasticity of demand is ranked on a scale of 1 – 9 (most elastic – 
most inelastic). 
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be synthesized in this model as the literature indicates that leverage is influential on 
the eventual outcomes of private equity backed transactions (Andrade and Kaplan, 
1998). 
 After constructing this matched sample, it is necessary to run a difference of 
means t-test29 to determine which variables, if any, contribute to the fate of a 
transaction as bankrupt or non-bankrupt.  Individual t-tests on each variable are run to 
determine whether or not the means of the 19 explanatory variables from each group 
are different with any statistical significance.  At the 5.0% significance level, the only 
variable whose group means are statistically different is the target firm industry 
inelasticity ranking.  At the 10.0% significance level, the dummy variable for a 
secondary LBO transaction and the continuous variable for the target firm industry 
inelasticity ranking are the variable means that are statistically significant across the 
two groups.  Statistical significance implies that these variables may affect the 
eventual fate of a transaction as bankrupt or non-bankrupt after a private equity 
backed acquisition occurs.  Other notable results for the bankrupt and non-bankrupt 
group, respectively, include average transaction values of $815.6 million and $685.7 
million, percentages of LBOs of 88.9% and 94.4%, percentages of secondary LBOs 
of 33.3% and 66.7% and percentages of the target sought by the sponsor of 96.9% 
and 100.0%.  While the means of these variables do not exhibit statistically 
significant differences across groups, it is intriguing that the transactions from the 
bankrupt group (relative to the non-bankrupt group) are more likely to be higher in 
value, less likely to be LBOs or secondary LBOs and generally seek a smaller 
                                                 
29
A “difference of means t-test” is a statistical approach used to test whether the means of two 
groups are different with statistical significance. 
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percentage of the target firm.  Although the statistical significance of these results is 
negligible, the differences in the variable means between the two groups may 
partially capture the effect of leverage on firm performance, which could be positive, 
as the transactions in the bankrupt group are less likely to have been completed as 
LBOs or secondary LBOs.  Leverage has been cited as one of the most important 
factors in a transaction’s bankruptcy but, as mentioned previously, information on 
this data point for the baseline sample and was unavailable for the majority of 
observations.  The means of the variables within the transaction-specific variable 
group, while statistically insignificant, highlight the importance of additional 
investigation on the influence of transaction leverage on failure.  For a list of all 
summary statistics for the matched sample, please see Table 1 in the Appendix. 
 
5.2 Binary-Response Models 
 
It is necessary to analyze the entire 259-transaction baseline sample to derive 
the potential differentiating features between those 18 transactions doomed for failure 
and the remaining 241 that are destined to succeed.  The self-evident weakness in 
evaluating a matched sample is the necessity to limit the number of non-bankrupt 
transactions in the control group to a number that matches the testing bankrupt group.  
We are prohibited from using MDA to analyze the baseline sample because the nature 
of our left-hand side bankruptcy variable is binary, i.e. non-continuous, and can only 
achieve a value of zero or one.  In response to this issue, I use two types of 
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multivariate binary-response models,30 the logit model and the probit model, which 
predict the probability of the occurrence of an event, i.e. target bankruptcy.  Both 
models estimate the joint probability of the occurrence of multiple correlated binary 
events with the assumption on the functional form of the relation between the 
dependent variable and the explanatory variables as the primary difference between 
the two models (Ashford and Sowden, 1970).  The logit model assumes a cumulative 
logarithmic distribution while the probit model assumes a cumulative normal 
distribution to fit a functional shape onto the sample and calculate coefficients for the 
explanatory variables.  When comparing the results from the models, the coefficients 
on our explanatory variables generally differ in magnitude but not in sign (positive or 
negative).  The magnitudes of the coefficients capture the effect of the pre-determined 
distribution shape that each model assumes while the signs of the coefficients explain 
the relationship that each regressor has with the response variable. Refer to Table 4 in 
the Appendix for a full description of the regression coefficient results from the 
binary-response models. 
 The advantage of multivariate analysis over univariate analysis, which 
analyzes the independent relationships between the regressors and the response 
variable,31 is the ability to observe the relationships that the explanatory variables 
share amongst each other.  Often times, two or more variables within a set of 
explanatory variables are highly correlated, which can affect the signs and 
magnitudes of the coefficients for our variables and their significance.  Of the original 
                                                 
30
 A “binary-response model” is a mean regression model in which the dependent variable takes only 
the values zero and one (Horowitz and Savin, 2001). 
31
 The terms “response variable” and “dependent variable” are used interchangeable in this study to 
refer to the binary “bankruptcy” variable. 
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19 pre-determined regressors used in these models, the dummies for a cash 
consideration offered and the public status of a target fall victim to multicollinearity 
and are dropped from this analysis.  Two more variables, the dummy for the presence 
of multiple sponsors and the continuous variable for number of sponsors involved in a 
transaction, contain data correlated with each other by over 70.0%, which requires the 
“number of sponsors” variable to be dropped from the models.  Refer to Table 3 in 
the Appendix to view the complete correlation matrix for the pre-specified variable 
list. 
The results from the binary-response models are also inconclusive, with only 
the effective federal funds rate variable used in the logit model exhibiting significance 
at the 10.0% level.  As explained previously, this variable aims to capture the 
influence of macroeconomic conditions, specifically the cost of financing as 
determined by the Federal Bank, on a transaction’s eventual success or failure.  The 
resulting positive coefficient on the variable of [0.279] and the signs of the 
coefficients on the other macroeconomic variables32 support the hypothesis that deals 
completed during times of economic expansion in which the Federal Bank typically 
raises interest rates to attract investor capital, are more prone to failure.  The values of 
the coefficients on the variables in the remaining three variable groups, while 
statistically insignificant, point to the unexpected relationships between a number of 
regressors and the response variable.   
The target-specific variable group holds mixed results if we compare the 
results to the hypothesized relationships between the two regressors within the group 
                                                 
32
 The other variables within this group are a dummy variable to measure whether a transaction 
occurs during an economic recession and a continuous variable to measure the magnitude of the TED 
Spread. 
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and the response variable.  As hypothesized, results indicate that transactions 
involving older targets with more years of managerial experience are less prone to 
failure than those involving younger targets.  Contrary to expectations, the positive 
coefficient on the variable ranking the inelasticity of demand of a target’s industry 
suggests that targets operating within more inelastic, i.e. more stable, industries are 
less prone to failure than those operating in more volatile industries.  The unexpected 
sign of the coefficient may have resulted from the arbitrary and somewhat subjective 
ranking process that I use to measure the relative resilience of a target’s industry. 
Coefficient results from the sponsor-specific variable group are entirely 
inconsistent with the hypothesized relationships between the regressors in the group 
and the dependent variable.  These results suggest (i) transactions involving multiple 
sponsors are less prone to failure than those involving a single sponsor; (ii) 
acquisitions orchestrated by public sponsors are less prone to failure than those 
arranged by private sponsors; and (iii) buyouts completed by younger sponsors with 
less years of experience are less prone to failure than those consummated by older 
sponsors.  The incongruity in the results relative to the hypotheses may be attributed 
to the potential existence of an incidental selection bias on the part of CapitalIQ 
towards the exclusion of less notable private equity deals arranged by younger 
sponsors that may have a higher bankruptcy incidence. 
The majority of the relationships between the transaction-specific variables 
and the dependent bankruptcy variable in the results are also incongruent.  The 
exceptions to this are the results for the dummy variable for a public-to-private 
transaction and the continuous variable for the sponsor’s percentage sought in the 
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target, which intimates that “going private”33 transactions and transactions in which 
the sponsor acquires a high percentage of the target are less prone to failure than 
others.  The coefficients on the remaining six variables within the transaction-specific 
group are inconsistent with the hypothesized relationships.  Results propose (i) LBO 
transactions and secondary LBOs are less prone to failure than non-LBOs; (ii) public-
to-private transactions are less prone to failure than other transactions; (iii) 
transactions completed without the participation of management are less prone to 
failure than those completed with management participation; and (iv) smaller 
transactions are less prone to failure than larger transactions.  In the attempt to create 
a proxy for transaction leverage, I synthesized two variables by interacting the 
dummy LBO variable and the dummy secondary LBO variable with the continuous 
transaction value variable.  These two variables were subsequently removed from the 
models upon the acknowledgement that the leverage ratio for a small buyout can be 
numerically identical to that of a large buyout. 
The regression results from the binary-response models suggest that the 
prevailing macroeconomic conditions have a statistically significant influence on a 
transaction’s eventual success or failure while the contributions from the remaining 
three variable groups are statistically insignificant.  In addition, the binary-response 
models assume distributions that are likely not representative of the sample’s actual 
distribution, as measured by the “pseudo R-squared.”  This descriptive statistic 
measures the goodness-of-fit of the functional form of a model by tabulating the 
percentage of the variation in the results explained by the regressors used in the 
model, which is 13.9% for the logit model and 14.17% for the probit model.  This 
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 The terms “going private” and “public-to-private” are used interchangeable in this study. 
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study was designed to place greater analytical weight on the results from the sponsor-
specific and transaction-specific variable groups over those from the macroeconomic-
specific and target-specific groups.  Statistically significant results from these groups 
would allow for analysis on the role of the sponsor, the financing decisions made by 
the sponsor and the deal experience and techniques that the sponsor brings to the table 
in the acquisition process.  With results proving statistically insignificant for the two 
former groups, we cannot isolate and evaluate these factors with any certitude and 
have consequently reached the end of the road for analysis on this particular sample 
of transactions.   
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6 DISCUSSION 
 
The principles of statistics and econometrics state that as the size of the 
studied sample increases, the mean and standard deviation of the sample approaches 
the true mean and standard deviation of the population.  This axiom provides a 
potential explanation for the lack of significance in the results and could imply that 
the few variables found to be significant may not accurately represent the general 
population of private equity backed transactions with transaction values in excess of 
$150 million.  It is evident that the data collection process, which employs 
CapitalIQ’s data screening tool, has adversely affected the quantity of observations 
contained within the baseline sample.  For example, the sample contains only the 
transactions that have occurred since 1989 because CapitalIQ’s database does not 
contain much data on the early history of private equity deals.  The private equity 
industry is one that experiences waves of activity in which a multitude of transactions 
are completed during macroeconomic expansions.  This limitation on the observation 
period leaves out the majority of transactions that occurred during the waves of 
private equity activity occurring prior to 1989, including the notorious LBO boom of 
the late 1980s.  For an illustration on the distribution of transaction dates within the 
baseline sample, refer to Figure 3 in the Appendix. 
The specificity of the research question, which limits the sample to third-party 
private equity backed transactions occurring in the United States with transaction 
values greater than $150 million, also prohibits the collection of a larger sample size.  
MBOs, MBIs and third-party private equity backed transactions are used in Wilson, 
Wright and Altanlar’s (2010) study on failure in the private equity industry in the 
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United Kingdom as opposed to solely examining third-party-backed transactions.  
The “type of investment firm” parameter is estimated to have limited the baseline 
sample size by two-thirds under the assumption that there exists an MBO and an MBI 
for each third-party private equity backed transaction within the industry.  The 
“transaction size” parameter may be equally damaging to the size of my baseline 
sample because it excludes smaller transactions from the collected baseline sample.  
The literature attests that these excluded smaller private equity deals have a greater 
risk of bankruptcy, which suggests that the inclusion of smaller deals would not only 
have increased the size of the baseline sample but would have likely increased the 
incidence of bankruptcy within the sample (Wilson, Wright and Altanlar, 2010).  If 
the assumption from the literature holds, the portion of bankrupt transactions within 
the baseline sample (6.9%) would have been larger had the excluded transactions 
with lower total values had been included.  Refer to Figure 4 in the Appendix for an 
illustration of the baseline sample’s transaction value distribution. 
CapitalIQ and the list of data parameters used in the data collection process 
may hold a selection bias and may have excluded bankrupt transactions that are 
(mis)classified as transactions completed by other types of investment firms.  
Strömberg and Kaplan (2008) utilize CapitalIQ’s screening tool to analyze the 
demography of the private equity industry and suggest the service “underreports 
private equity transactions before the mid-1990s, particularly smaller transactions.”  
These findings may contain a possible explanation as to why most of the transactions 
our sample occur post-1993 and why the average transaction size is as large as $783.6 
million.  The reason CapitalIQ underreports these types of transactions may be due to 
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a bias towards the documentation of deals by more reputable and experienced 
sponsors, which are inherently less likely to encounter future failure as well (Wilson, 
Wright and Altanlar, 2010). 
As noted previously, this study requires us to make use of snapshot data that is 
reported on the date of the target’s acquisition to fill in variable data for a sample of 
transactions.  Instead of using data from one date to predict a transaction’s eventual 
bankruptcy, researchers prefer to use hazard rate models that utilize data from 
quarterly and annual reports.  In the world of private equity investing where hundreds 
of millions of dollars of investor capital is often on the line, a “black box” period 
exists between the closed date of the transaction and the exit date of the sponsor’s 
investment fund, during which most fundamental information relating to the 
performance of the target firm is sensitive, confidential and non-public.  Even public 
sponsors, whose consolidated financials are required to be released on a quarterly 
basis, do not typically break out the performance of their subsidiary acquisition 
investments for fear of possibly compromising the returns on these investments and 
consequently losing out on future capital from investors that would not want to 
allocate capital to a fund if they knew that a subsidiary of the fund was performing 
poorly. 
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7 CONCLUSION 
 
  The results from the three economic models used in this study are 
inconclusive and generally inconsistent with the hypothesized relationships between 
the explanatory variables and the response variable for transaction bankruptcy.  The 
matched sample model, which tests for significance in the difference in the means of 
the explanatory variables between the bankrupt and non-bankrupt groups, suggests a 
target’s industry inelasticity of demand and the characterization of a transaction as an 
LBO are the only two influential factors on transaction bankruptcy.  Results from the 
binary-response models validate the hypothesis that transactions are less likely to fail 
when the effective federal funds rate is lowered by the Fed in order to stimulate 
investment and consumption during macroeconomic contractions.  With the exception 
of the federal funds rate variable, evidence from the binary-response models rejects 
the hypothesis that factors observed upon the date of a transaction’s completion may 
serve as indicators of eventual transaction bankruptcy. 
 This paper takes a unique approach to financial distress within the American 
private equity industry with the construction of a bankruptcy risk prediction model 
reliant on data collected on the date of a deal’s closing to predict its future 
bankruptcy.  It is likely that the accuracy and effectiveness of the models are 
adversely affected by the private nature of the industry in question and the other 
limitations and weakness that have been acknowledged previously.  It may well be 
the case that a model does not exist for the effective prediction of bankruptcy for 
private equity backed acquisitions.  However, it is more likely that additional or 
unlimited access to data on the sponsors and their targets during the sponsor’s holding 
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period may bestow other researchers with the ability to more completely evaluate this 
topic. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1: Matched Sample Model: Summary Statistics 
 
 Table 2: Baseline Sample: Summary Statistics 
 
Means Standard Deviations
Variable Group Bankrupt Non-Bankrupt Bankrupt Non-Bankrupt
Effective Federal Funds Rate** Macroeconomic 4.63 3.38 1.65 2.55
TED  Spread Macroeconomic 0.67 0.73 0.42 0.56
Macroeconomic Contraction Dummy Macroeconomic 0.06 0.22 0.24 0.43
Public Target Dummy Target 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.24
Target Years of Experience Target 38.00 48.33 40.75 46.50
No. Previous Transactions as Target Target 3.17 2.67 1.34 1.24
Target Industry Inelasticity of Demand (1-9)* Target 4.28 3.33 3.03 2.38
Public Sponsor Dummy Sponsor 0.06 0.00 0.24 0.00
Sponsor Years of Experience Sponsor 38.78 22.22 66.90 13.64
Multiple Sponsors Dummy Sponsor 0.33 0.44 0.49 0.51
No. Transaction Sponsors Sponsor 1.83 1.67 1.65 0.91
Total Transaction Value Transaction 815.61 685.75 1,815.90 1,263.41
LBO Transaction Dummy Transaction 0.89 0.94 0.32 0.24
Secondary LBO Transaction Dummy* Transaction 0.33 0.67 0.49 0.49
Public-to-Private Transaction Dummy Transaction 0.17 0.28 0.38 0.46
Management Participation Transaction Dummy Transaction 0.28 0.44 0.46 0.51
Dividend Recapital ization Transaction Dummy Transaction 0.11 0.17 0.32 0.38
Percentage of Target Sought Transaction 0.97 1.00 0.08 0.00
** Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level
* Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level
Total Observations: 36 (18 bankrupt, 18 non-bankrupt)
Variable Group Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Bankruptcy Dummy Response 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00
Effective Federal Funds Rate Macroeconomic 3.76 1.81 0.18 10.48
TED  Spread Macroeconomic 0.54 0.42 0.13 2.71
Macroeconomic Contraction Dummy Macroeconomic 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00
Public Target Dummy Target 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00
Target Years of Experience Target 45.65 39.91 1.00 236.00
No. Previous Transactions as Target Target 3.42 1.66 0.00 9.00
Target Industry Inelasticity of Demand (1-9) Target 3.41 2.49 0.00 1.00
Public Sponsor Dummy Sponsor 0.05 0.21 5.00 301.00
Sponsor Years of Experience Sponsor 25.21 23.54 1.00 10.00
Multiple Sponsors Dummy Sponsor 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00
No. Transaction Sponsors Sponsor 1.53 1.06 0.00 0.00
Total Transaction Value Transaction 783.58 1,717.71 152.00 2,426.18
LBO Transaction Dummy Transaction 0.95 0.23 0.00 1.00
Secondary LBO Transaction Dummy Transaction 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00
Public-to-Private Transaction Dummy Transaction 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00
Management Participation Transaction Dummy Transaction 0.34 0.48 0.00 1.00
Dividend Recapitalization Transaction Dummy Transaction 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
Percentage of Target Sought Transaction 0.98 0.06 0.72 1.00
Total Observations: 259
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Table 3: Baseline Sample: Correlation Matrix 
 
Table 4: Binary-Response Models: Regression Results 
 
  
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19]
Bankruptcy Dummy [1] 1
Effective Federal Funds Rate [2] 0.13 1
TED  Spread [3] 0.09 0.24 1
Macroeconomic Contraction Dummy [4] -0.05 -0.06 0.46 1
Public Target Dummy [5] -0.10 -0.16 -0.07 -0.01 1
Target Years of Experience [6] -0.05 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.09 1
No. Previous Transactions as Target [7] -0.04 0.00 0.11 0.02 0.12 -0.06 1
Target Industry Inelasticity of Demand (1-9) [8] 0.10 -0.03 0.08 0.03 0.15 -0.06 0.13 1
Public Sponsor Dummy [9] 0.01 0.05 0.08 -0.02 0.10 0.07 0.08 -0.09 1
Sponsor Years of Experience [10] 0.16 -0.03 0.12 0.08 0.00 -0.08 -0.04 0.12 0.07 1
Multiple Sponsors Dummy [11] 0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.06 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.10 1
No. Transaction Sponsors [12] 0.08 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 0.01 -0.05 0.08 0.28 0.71 1
Total Transaction Value [13] 0.01 -0.01 0.10 0.11 0.16 -0.04 -0.05 -0.11 0.06 0.00 0.11 0.02 1
LBO Transaction Dummy [14] -0.07 0.02 -0.04 0.04 0.08 0.05 -0.06 0.07 -0.43 -0.30 -0.27 -0.52 -0.02 1
Secondary LBO Transaction Dummy [15] -0.08 -0.11 -0.13 -0.12 0.11 0.12 0.16 0.10 -0.10 -0.05 -0.15 -0.03 -0.13 0.03 1
Public-to-Private Transaction Dummy [16] -0.04 0.10 0.23 0.23 -0.03 -0.10 0.07 -0.13 -0.03 -0.07 0.01 -0.04 0.19 0.04 -0.35 1
Management Participation Transaction Dummy [17] -0.04 -0.21 -0.22 -0.04 0.04 0.01 -0.05 -0.08 0.03 -0.05 0.13 0.09 -0.11 -0.01 0.16 -0.11 1
Dividend Recapitalization Transaction Dummy [18] -0.06 0.07 -0.10 -0.04 0.10 -0.09 0.19 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.18 0.12 -0.08 -0.01 -0.08 -0.13 0.00 1
Percentage of Target Sought [19] -0.03 -0.11 0.05 0.06 -0.10 -0.06 -0.10 -0.06 -0.10 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.06 -0.06 -0.04 0.18 0.12 -0.33 1
Variable Coefficient
Variable Group Probit Logit
Effective Federal Funds Rate Macroeconomic 0.1349 0.3081*
TED  Spread Macroeconomic 0.4694 0.9028
Macroeconomic Contraction Dummy Macroeconomic -0.8999 -1.6037
Public Target Dummy Target Dropped
Target Years of Experience Target -0.0021 -0.0080
No. Previous Transactions as Target Target -0.0194 -0.0713
Target Industry Inelasticity of Demand (1-9) Target 0.0875 0.1591
Public Sponsor Dummy Sponsor -0.2646 -0.7234
Sponsor Years of Experience Sponsor 0.0051 0.0063
Multiple Sponsors Dummy Sponsor -0.2037 -0.3006
No. Transaction Sponsors Sponsor Dropped
Total Transaction Value Transaction 0.0001 0.0001
LBO Transaction Dummy Transaction -0.2200 -0.8035
Secondary LBO Transaction Dummy Transaction -0.4480 -0.9198
Public-to-Private Transaction Dummy Transaction -0.4372 -0.8712
Management Participation Transaction Dummy Transaction 0.1996 0.2698
Dividend Recapitalization Transaction Dummy Transaction -0.6165 -1.2683
Percentage of Target Sought Transaction -2.6524 -3.5875
** Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level
* Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level
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Figure 1: Simmons Bedding Company: Transaction History 
 
 
Note: Simmons was acquired by Wesray Capital in 1986 and sold to the employee stock ownership plan in 1989. 
Source: Creswell (2009) 
 
Figure 2: Historical Bankruptcy Rate for Sponsor-Backed LBOs 
 
Source: Strömberg (2007)  
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Figure 3: Baseline Sample: Transaction Date Distribution 
 
Figure 4: Baseline Sample: Transaction Value Distribution 
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